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of the Distribution of Income
re
er
Designed to make the fruits of my research effort intelligible
to the nonspecialist, this chapter presents an elementary analysis
of the determinants of the distribution of labor market income.
Within this framework it also discusses some of the more impor-
tant aspects of the theory and findings comprising the technical
chapters in Parts B and C.
EQUALIZING WAGE DIFFERENTIALS AND NONMONEY
ASPECTS OF JOBS
No discussion of the theory of labor market income can ignore
Adam Smith's contribution. In his 1776 volume, The Wealth of
Nations, Smith introduced the idea of compensating wage differen-
tials in competitive labor markets.' He wrote: "The whole of the
advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of
labor and stock must, in the same neighborhood, be either per-
fectly equal or constantly tending to equality. If in the same neigh.
- borhoodthere was any employment evidently either more or less
advantageous than the rest, so many people would crowd into it
in the one case, and so many would desert it in the other, that its
1. Modern Library edition, Book I, Chapter 10, p. 99. 1 am willing to
wager that Smith's Chapter 10 is the most frequently cited work written
prior to 1960 on reading lists in labor economics.
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advantages would soon return to the level of other employments."
That is, if in a single geographical area workers of equal ability can
freely sell their labor services to any one of many employers, com-
petition among workers for the jobs with more desirable non-
money characteristics will make, on balance, all jobs equally at-
tractive—the sum of the money and nonmoney benefits are equal.
Let us define a "job" as an employment at particular tasks, in
a particular firm, in a particular location, under given working
conditions. A change in a job can be thought of as a change in any
of these characteristics. For example, acting as short-order cook
for Nathans, located in Times Square in New York City, during
the day shift, represents a job. An employment with a different
task (manager), or firm (Chock Full O'Nuts), or location (Nathan's
in Coney Island), or working condition (the night shift) would
represent a different job.
Suppose there are two jobs, A and B, employing large numbers
of workers, alike in all respects except for one characteristic. Job
A is dirty, or physically strenuous, or dangerous, et cetera. Suppose
for the moment that all workers are identical in all respects.
Everyone views the different characteristic to be unfavorable to
job A. For an equal wage in jobs A and B no one would select job
A; everyone would want to enter job B. Suppose we wish to bribe
people to enter job A by paying a sufficiently higher wage in job A
(WA )thanin job B (WB). Since we assume workers to be identical,
f they would all be willing to leave job B and enter job A for the
T same positive wage differential, which we call d0 (d =WA-WB).
For example, suppose job A represents employment as a short-or- e der cook in the summer without air conditioning or a fan, and job
B represents employment as a short-order cook in the summer with
an electric fan. For the same wage, no one would want to work in A
job A, but, for a sufficiently larger wage in job A, job A would be
preferable to job B. c;
Curve S0 in Figure 2-1 shows the number of workers who sup-
ply their labor to job A at each wage differential.2 If the difference ti'
in wages between jobs A and B were less than d0, everyone would
prefer to enter job B and no worker would choose job A. At a dif-
ferential above d0,allworkers would want to enter job A and none
job B. At the differential d0, the workers are indifferent between si
jobsAandB. ft
Curve DA in Figure 2-1 is a downward-sloping market demand
curvefor workers in job A relative to job B. The negative slope of











Supply and Demand for Labor—Homogeneous Tastes
the demand curve is based on the assumption that there is imper-
fect substitution of workers for one job compared to the other.
The point where the demand curve and the supply curve intersect
indicates the equilibrium number of workers in job A and the
equilibrium wage differential between jobs A and B.
Shifts would occur in the supply curve if working conditions,
or the perception of the working conditions, were to change. Job
A initially has supply curve S0 and a positive wage differential.
Now, however, let us assume that demand conditions are un-
changed, but that an air conditioner is added to job A, so that now
job A is preferred to job B.The new supply curve is S1, and a nega-
tive wage differential emerges; job A now pays less than job B.
Up to this point we have assumed that all workers have the
same tastes for the characteristics of a job. People differ, however,
in their evaluation of the same working conditions. Some have
strong preferences for an air-conditioned office, while others pre-
fer an office with a fan. In the context of our simple example,
those who have a preference for the working conditions in job A
compared to job B offer their services to job A even when the
wage is lower than in job B. Those who are indifferent will enter
job A if the wage in A is at least as large as in job B. Finally, those














who prefer the characteristics in job B to those in job A require
the inducement of a higher wage in A than in B to enter job A.
The supply of labor at a given wage equals the sum of all workers
who would enter at that wage or at a lower wage. Thus, differences
in tastes for the nonmoney characteristics of jobs result in a rising
labor supply curve. (See curve S in Figure 2-2.)
Thus far we have considered the distribution of tastes for the
two jobs and the resulting shape of the supply curve. The market
wage differential (d) and the number employed in jobs A and B
depend on both supply and demand conditions. The supply curve
in Figure 2-2 depicts a situation where the majority of people dis-
like job A compared to job B. There are some, however, who pre-
fer A to B. On the demand side, Figure 2-2 features three demand
curves. With demand curve D1, the quantities demanded and sup-
plied are equal at a negative wage differential.3 Suppose the rela-
tive demand curve for labor in job A shifts outward to D2 and
then to D3. For the same supply relation, the outward shift of de-
mand increases the wage differential (d =WA-WB), andmore
workers enter job A.
Note the difference between average tastes (d) and marginal
tastes (i.e., tastes at the intersection of the supply and demand
curves). Market wages are determined by tastes at the equilibrium,
and wage differentials depend on both supply and demand. Those
who have a stronger-than-market taste for an activity (i.e., those
who would enter at a wage differential below d1 )willbe in that
activity—in this case, job A. Those who have weaker-than-market
tastes will be in the alternative activity.4
3. Although most people dislike job A, there are enough who like it,
given the demand D1 for labor in job A, for the number of workers offering C
themselves at a zero differential to exceed the number demanded. For ex- m ample, suppose 5 per cent of a 1,000-man workforce enjoys climbing poles
so much that they are willing to be telephone pole climbers for lower wages
than for otherwise "similar" work on terra firma (supply curve S). Suppose CC
that for equal wages the phone companies wish to employ only thirty w
workers as pole climbers (demand curve D1). Clearly, at equal wages in the
two jobs, the supply of labor is greater than the demand for labor (fifty men
compared to thirty jobs), so that pole climbers' wages will fall relative to
wages in the other job. The fall in wages has two effects which help bring
about market equilibrium. Because of the rising supply curve, fewer workers
want to be pole climbers, and because of the downward.sloping demand
curve more such workers are demanded. w
4. The difference between the wage differential a worker requires to in-







































Supply and Demand for Labor—Heterogeneous Tastes
SEASONALITY AND ANNUAL INCOME
The analysis of compensating wage differentials is used in Part
C's theoretical discussion of the effect of seasonality of employ-
ment on weekly wages and on annual earnings.
Let us assume that two jobs, A and B, have similar working
conditions. At the start of each year (or each working life), a
worker freely chooses between entering job A or job B, but he can-
not reverse his decision within the year (or worklife). Job B in-
volves a full year of employment, but job A is seasonal, providing
work for only forty weeks per year. During the twelve weeks of
unemployment in job A, the worker receives no wage from A. For
simplicity let us assume he is unemployed during these twelve
weeks. Although workers place a positive value on the weekly
"income" received while unemployed (i.e., unemployment insur-
ance and leisure), let us assume that they all evaluate this to be
less than the weekly wage in job B.
I16 Introduction A.
Under equilibrium conditions, the real annual compensation in
the two activities, job A and job B, would be equal. Since lower
real weekly income is received in the "off season" in job A,
workers enter job A only if the weekly wage while working in job ii
A exceeds that of job B. Suppose the weekly wage in job B is
$100, providing a $5,200 annual income. A worker receives $45 ti
per week as unemployment insurance for each week unemployed c.
and values the leisure gained at $30 per week. His annual income T
in job A at a weekly wage WA would then be 4O(WA) + 12(45 + g'
30). The worker prefers job A if this sum exceeds $5,200. At the
weekly wage WA =$107.50,the worker earns the same annual ci
income in the two activities; he enters job A only if the weekly c;
wage in job A is equal to or greater than $107.50. This simple ti
model of wages in seasonal industries implies that jobs offering
relatively less employment during the year offer higher weekly or
hourly wages for the time actually worked. The higher wage corn- ai
pensates for less income during the period of unemployment.
If the wage rate were the same regardless of the number of ti
weeks worked, annual income could be written as the product of S(-
annual income from a full year's employment and the fraction of
the fifty-two weeks in the year the individual worked. A 1 per cent
increase in the fraction of the year employed would then increase p
annual income by 1 per cent. The seasonality of employment p
model, however, postulates that those who work more weeks per
year have a higher annual income but a smaller weekly income; a ii
1 per cent increase in the fraction of weeks worked would increase
annual income, but by less than 1 per cent. The relationship be- a
tween the per cent change in annual income and the per cent a
change in the fraction of weeks worked is called "the elasticity of
income with respect to weeks worked" and is designated by y. The S
seasonality of employment model implies that yispositive but b
less than unity. (The parameter -y plays an important role in our a





The basic framework employed in this study of income distri-
bution is one in which the returns to an individual from labor
market activity are a function of his stock of training—or "human
capital." The concept of human capital will become clearer, and
sound less cold-blooded, if each of the two component words are
examined separately. . Rj
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in Capital may be defined as anything produced at a cost and
'er providing useful services over time in either production or con-
A sumption. Thus, a drill press or a clothes washing machine are cap-
ital goods. Rainfall is not capital unless it is influenced by man.
is There are some human characteristics which satisfy this defini-
45 tion of capital. For example, my knowledge of economics was
ed created at a cost and has produced a stream of services over time.
The cost of producing my stock of knowledge involved my fore-
+ goingboth what I would have otherwise done with my time (op-
he portunity cost of time) and what I would have otherwise pur-
ial chased (goods and services). The services yielded over time by this
dy capital include teaching and research, as well as my own consump-
)le tion benefits from my knowledge of the subject.
ng Thereis, however, a fundamental difference between my
or "knowledge of economics" as capital and my "washing machine"
rn. as capital—my knowledge of economics is embodied in me. I can
sell my "washing machine" and become unaffected by its use
of thereafter. I cannot sell my "knowledge," but can only rent its
of services to others. In addition, I must endure the conditions under
of which the renting of my labor services takes place: thus, I care
whether I teach in an overheated classroom or one in which air-
sse planes pass overhead every few minutes. Capital (productive
power) embodied in a person is referred to as human capital.
er Since human capital is created at a cost, no one would will-
;a ingly invest in human capital unless it generated sufficient mone-
ise tary or nonmonetary benefits to compensate for the cost. The
analysis of investment in human capital is part of the broader
analysis of compensating wage differentials.
of Human capital can be acquired in several different ways.
he Schooling, vocational training, formal on-the-job training, learning
rnt by doing, medical care, acquiring information, and migration are
)ur means by which individuals can increase their productivity. Hence
they create human capital. Unfortunately, we cannot directly
measure units of human capital (i.e., productive power). This
study focuses on the money income-producing effects of years of
formal schooling and years of labor market experience after
schooling, all of which are quantifiable.5
_______
)or 5. This does not imply that training is not productive outside of the
market place. Several recent studies do, in fact, suggest that schooling is pro.
'md ductive in household activities. For example, holding income constant, those
with more schooling appear to be more efficient consumers, to have better
are health, and to provide a higher quality of child care. See, for example,
Robert Michael, The Effect of Education on Efficiency in Consumption,18 Introduction A
ONE PERIOD OF TRAINING
'1
Training is not without costs. A year of schooling, for ex- a
ample, involves direct and opportunity costs. Direct costs are out-
of-pocket expenditures that otherwise would not have been in-
curred, such as tuition charges and the cost of books. Opportunity
costs, sometimes called indirect costs, are the monetary equivalent t.
of the time devoted to the investment in schooling.
C
Supposejobs A and B are alike in all respects except one: job
A requires a year of training beyond high school, whereas job B re- e
quires only a high school education. If the two jobs offer the same t
annual income, all high school graduates will choose job B over job t
A and none will acquire the extra training required for job A. If e
the benefits from the two jobs are equal but job A requires ex- I
penditures before a worker can enter it, job A is inferior to job B.
I
If,however, the annual income from job A exceeds the annual in-
V
comefrom job B by an amount sufficiently large to compensate
for the training cost, workers will be induced to acquire the extra
training and enter job A. If there are individual differences in the
ability to learn the task required for job A or individual differences
in the evaluation of income received in the future, workers will
differ as to the wage differential that will make them view the two
jobs as equally attractive. That is, the supply of labor to job A
relative to job B will be upward rising. With a demand curve for
labor and a supply curve of labor, a market income differential (d)
E
betweenjobs A and B emerges.
Under a few simplifying assumptions,6 the rate of return from
an investment (r) can be written approximately as the ratio of the
New York, NBER, 1972; Michael Grossman, The Demand for Health: A
Theoretical and Empirical Investigation, New York, NBER, 1972; Arleen
Leibowitz, "Women's Allocation of Time to Market and Nonmarket Ac-
tivities: Differences by Education," Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University,
1972; and Zvi Griliches and William Mason, "Education, Income and Ability," a
Journal of Political Economy, Supplement, May-June 1972.
6. The assumptions are that the costs (c) occur in one period, the annual
increment in wages (d) is constant over time, and that the differential is re-
ceived for a very long period of time. The internal rate of return (r) is the rate
of discount which sets the cost of an investment equal to the present value of
the benefits from the investment. That is,
Nd
where N is the number of periods in which benefits are received. However, if AA Nontechnical Analysis of the Distribution of Income 19
annual differential (d) to the cost Cc) of the investment, r =d/c.
Therefore, the annual income of a worker in job A can be written
as
=s-TB+ dYB + rc.
This is shown in Figure 2-3. The income line YA is higher than
the income line by d dollars. The shaded area represents the
cost of the training needed for job A.
Let us assume everyone in job A has the same income, and
everyone in job B has the same income. Average income is higher,
the larger the proportion of the population in job A, or the higher
the average level of training in the population. There is no in-
equality in income if everyone is in job A or everyone is in job B.
There is inequality if some workers are in job A and the others are
in job B. In Figure 2-3 income inequality is largest when half of the
workers are in job A and half in job B, that is, when the inequality
of training is at a maximum.
We are also interested in the effect of the rate of return from
training (r) and the amount of dollars invested in the year of train-
ing (c) on the average level and the inequality of income. Recall
.5 that the wage differential (d) was d =rc.For a particular distribu-
tion of investment in years of training (i.e., some workers in A and
the others in B), the level and inequality of income is larger, the
greater the differential (d). (See Figure 2-4.) Thus, the level and in-
equality of income is larger, the larger the rate of return from










AsN becomes large, S approaches dir, and c =dir.Hence, r =dfc.FIGURE 2-3
One Period of Training
FIGURE 2-4
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SCHOOLING MODEL OF INCOME INEQUALITY
Part B develops and tests empirically a model that relates in-
come to schooling. Data for the United States, Canada, and several
other countries are employed and the effects of schooling com-
puted for both differences in individual incomes within a region
and differences in relative income inequality across regions.
Individual differences in years of schooling are found to be
an important variable for explaining individual differences in in-
come within regions. For the United States, differences in years of
schooling explain from 17 to 51 per cent of individual differences
in the income of adult males within each state, and 29 per cent is
the average intrastate explanatory power of schooling. State dif-
ferences in the rate of return from schooling and the inequality
of schooling explain 60 per cent of state differences in the in-
equality of income. The greater income inequality in the Southern
states can be explained by the greater inequality of schooling and
the higher rate of return from schooling in the South.
The interregional analyses of income inequality for Canada
and the Netherlands, as well as the various international analyses,
provide additional support for the hypothesis that income in-
equality is larger, the higher the rate of return from schooling and
the greater the inequality of schooling. Although less developed
countries tend to have a larger inequality of income, this is not
true when we adjust for intercountry differences in the inequality
of years of schooling and the rate of return from schooling. That
is, with the latter two variables held fixed, there is no relation,
empirically, between income inequality and the level of income.
The model also provides a framework for understanding the in-
come distribution effects of historical events and institutional
arrangements which alter either the distribution of schooling or
the rate of return from schooling. This is done through analyses of
the income distribution effects of mass immigration into Israel,
the effects of minimum schooling legislation on the distribution of
schooling and hence also income in Great Britain and the United
States, and the effects of economic change per se on income in-
equality.22 Introduction
MIGRATION AND THE RATE OF RETURN
FROM SCHOOLING
If workers with high levels of schooling were perfect sub-
stitutes for those with low levels of schooling, relative wages would
depend solely on technical production considerations (i.e., the sub-
stitution coefficient). For example, if one college graduate were
always as productive as two high school graduates, the wage of the
former would always be twice that of the latter, regardless of the
relative supply of college graduates. There is evidence, however, to
show that high-level manpower (college graduates) is qualitatively
different from less-skilled manpower, and that the two factors are
1•
not perfect substitutes.7 Hence, there is a downward-sloping de-
mand curve for skilled manpower relative to less-skilled manpower.
In terms of the analysis of income distribution, this negatively
sloped relative demand curve plays an,important role.
Let us view each state of the United States as a labor market.
Wages of college graduates vary little across the states because of
their high mobility. There is, in effect, a national labor market for
college graduates. For those with less schooling, the tendency to
migrate is weaker and there are significant state differences in wage
rates.8 The result: higher rates of return from schooling in the
poorer states.9
Those with more schooling have a higher propensity to migrate
for several reasons. First, schooling may increase a person's aware-
ness of other areas and thereby reduce the cost of moving to a new
environment. Second, college schooling itself often entails moving
to a new area and thus loosens ties to the place of origin. Third,
since those who acquire more schooling tend to be wealthier—and
since greater wealth facilitates investment in all forms of human
7.See Carmel J. HUman, "The Rise of Professional Occupations in the
American Labor Force," Ph.D dissertation, Columbia University, 1972; and
Finis Welch, "Education in Production," Journal of Political Economy,
January-February 1970, pp. 35-59.
8. SeeRashiFein, "Educational PatternsinSouthern Migration,"
Southern Economic Journal, Supplement, (Part 2), July 1965, pp. 106-124;
June O'Neill, "The Effect of Income and Education on Inter-Regional Mi-
gration," Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1970; and Thomas J.
Courchene, "Interprovincial Migration and Economic Adjustment," Cana-
dian Journal of Economics, November 1970, pp. 550-577.
9. See Chapter 5 below; see also W. Lee Hansen, "Total and Private Rates a:
of Return to Investment in Schooling," Journal of Political Economy, April
1963, pp. 128-140; and Giora Hanoch, "An Economic Analysis of Earnings
and Schooling," Journal of Human Resources, Summer 1967, pp. 310-329.
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capital (including migration)—those with more schooling also tend
to be those who invest more in migration. Fourth, because of
direct costs of migration that are unrelated to skill level, the rate
of return from migration tends to be higher for those with more
skill.10
A higher rate of migration from the poorer states by skilled
workers relative to unskilled workers increases the ratio of skilled
to unskilled workers in the wealthier states and decreases it in the
poorer states. Given the same negatively sloped demand curve for
labor, the wage ratio of skilled to unskilled workers is depressed
in the wealthier states and boosted in the poorer states. The result
is a decline in the rate of return from schooling in the wealthier
region and a rise in the poorer region.
The higher rate of return from schooling in the poorer regions
within a country proves to be a major explanation for the larger
inequality of income in the southern states of the United States
(see Chapter 5). In addition, although the Atlantic provinces of
Canada (the poorer provinces) have small inequalities of schooling,
they have higher rates of return, and this tends to reduce inter-
provincial differences in income inequality.
An additional illustration is furnished by a time series study of
income inequality in the Jewish population of Israel (see Chapter
6). Relative to the size of its population, Israel has experienced
large exogenous immigration. During the two decades before inde-
pendence (1948), the immigrants contained a high proportion of
skilled workers. If we assume that the relative demand curve re-
mained stable, the outward shift of labor supply should have de-
pressed the relative wage of skilled workers—as, in fact, it did. In
the decade after independence, the immigration primarily brought
unskilled workers, and the relative wage of skilled to unskilled
workers increased. These changes in the relative wage can be trans-
lated into movements in the rate of return from schooling. As pre-
dicted by the schooling model of income distribution, income
inequality was small and showed a contracting tendency in the
pre-independence period and an uptrend after independence.
POSTSCHOOL TRAINING AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION
In the section entitled "One Period of Training" (p. 18)
above, a simple training model was used to demonstrate that the
level and inequality of income are a function of the level and in-
S
________
10.For a proof of this, see Chapter 5 below.
4 I,24 Introduction
equality of training, the rate of return from the training, and the
dollar intensity of the relevant investment among individuals.
Postschool training, however, is not an all-or-nothing investment
made in the first year after the completion of formal schooling.
In Part C, postschool training is viewed as a continuous variable
in which the ratio of dollar investments to potential income is
assumed to decline over time.1' This permits dollar investments in
training to be translated into years of experience (postschool train-
ing). The scarcity of data on dollar investments in training versus
the availability of data on years of schooling and age virtually dic-
tate that the empirical analysis be specified in terms of years of ex-
perience, where experience is measured by the number of years
since leaving school.
The conclusions of the one-period-of-training model are gen-
eralized into years of experience (or age, if schooling is held con-
stant), measured as a continuous variable. Within the levels of
schooling, the average level of earnings of adults is expected to be
higher the greater the average age (or the average level of expe-
rience) of the population. Similarly, the inequality of earnings is
expected to be greater the more unequal the distribution of age
(experience). The effect of a year of experience on income is re-
ferred to as the slope of the "experience-earnings profile." This
slope steepens with larger dollar investments in postschool train-
ing and a higher rate of return from this training. Finally, the more
the slope of the profile steepens, the stronger the effect of the
age distribution on income distribution becomes. These are the
basic hypotheses examined in Part C of this volume.
POSTSCHOOL TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT
The relationship between the distribution of employment dur-
ing the year and the distribution of annual income is explicitly
examined in Part C below (p. 107). In this chapter we have al-
ready examined the concept of compensating wage differentials
and the relationship between seasonality of employment and
annual and weekly income. Here we turn to the theory behind
another factor that influences individual differences in employ-
ment during the year: investment in postschool training.
_______
0
11.The relative decline in investments occurs because life is finite (and,
thus, there are a smaller number of periods in which to receive benefits from '4
investmentsmade later in life) and because the most profitable postschool
training investments are made during the first few years in the labor market.A Nontechnical Analysis of the Distribution of Income 25
Investment in postschool training may be of two types: gen-
eral and specific.'2 General training is training that is useful (pro-
ductive) both in the firm in which it is acquired and in many other
firms. Specific training, on the other hand, is productive only in
the firm in which it is acquired. It includes learning the layout of
the work-place, the procedures peculiar to the company, and the
characteristics of fellow employees (supervisors and subordinates).
Since a worker with only general training is equally productive
in many firms, he would stay in the firm in which he acquired the
training only if it paid a wage at least equal to what he could ob-
tain elsewhere. Thus, the firm would not be able to benefit from
investing in the worker's general training, and therefore would not
make such investments. Consequently, the worker finances the in-
vestments in his general training himself.
A worker with specific training is more productive in the firm
in which he acquired the training than elsewhere. He would tend
to stay with the firm in he acquired his training if he is paid
a wage greater than his best alternative. The firm is willing to fi-
nance some of the specific training if the worker, once trained, re-
ceives a wage less than his value to the firm.'3 Because of specific
training, a worker's wage in a firm can be greater than his next
best alternative and still less than his value to the firm.
Stability of employment increases with greater amounts of
specific training because of the wedges between the cost to the
firm of the worker (his wage), the worker's value to the firm,
and his value to other firms. For example, assuming that wages do
not decline during recessions, the value to the firm of workers
with only general training decreases when a recession occurs,
making it costly to the firm to retain the worker, since his wage
exceeds his value. As a result, disemployment of workers begins.
However, the case is different for workers with some specific
training. Since their value to the firm is higher than their wage in a
nonrecession year, when a recession does occur it may still be
profitable for the firm to retain the workers, although their value
to the firm may decline. Also, workers with more specific training
have lower quit rates than those with less. This is so because the
worker is more productive in the firm in which the specific train-
ing is acquired than elsewhere.
12. The distinction between general and specific training and the analysis
of the employment effects were developed by Gary S. Becker. See his Human
Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Ed-
ucation, New York, NBER, 1974.
13. The value of a worker to the firm is the value of the extra output
produced by him.26 Introduction
Workers who have more than average human capital of one
type usually have more of other types, too. For example, those
with higher levels of schooling also have higher rates of migration
and make larger dollar investments in their postschool training.'4
It seems reasonable to conclude that those with more general train-
ing also have more specific training and consequently lower quit
and layoff rates. Thus, because of specific training, ceteris paribus,
the higher the weekly wages, the greater the fraction of weeks
worked during a year.
Recall that we previously used the symbol -y to designate the
elasticity of annual earnings with respect to the fraction of weeks
worked during the year. If a 1 per cent increase in weeks worked
does not change the weekly wage, annual earnings go up 1 per cent
and -y =1.In the case of specific training, however, those with 1
per cent more weeks worked have higher weekly wages and thus
annual incomes which are larger by more than 1 per cent. Hence, 'y
exceeds unity. The seasonality of employment model discussed
above suggests that, holding specific training constant, those who
work 1 per cent more weeks per year have lower weekly wages and
annual incomes that are larger, but by less than 1 per cent—hence
-y is positive but less than unity.
In the empirical analysis of Part C, the elasticity -y is computed
for white and nonwhite males and is compared to the value of
unity. For white males the estimated value of y does not differ
from unity. For nonwhite males, however, the estimated y is less
than unity. This racial difference may be explained by smaller in-
vestments in postschool training and a greater seasonality of em-
ployment for nonwhite males.1
ANALYSIS OF LEVEL OF INCOME
If we pull together the analyses of the schooling, postschool
training, and employment models discussed in this chapter, we
can develop a framework for explaining regional differences in the
14. For migration, see references in footnote 8, P. 22. For postschool
training, see Jacob Mincer, "On-the-Job Training: Costs, Returns and Some
Implications," Journal of Political Economy, Supplement, October 1962,
pp. 50-79, and Schooling, Experience, and Earnings, NBER, 1974, Part 2;
also Thomas Johnson, "Returns from Investment in Human Capital,"
American Economic Review, September 1970, pp. 546-560.
15. For a study of racial differences in postschool training, see Mincer,
"On-the-Job Training" and Johnson, "Returns from Investment in Human
Capital."For racialdifferencesinthe seasonality of employment, see
Chapter 7, p. 126, footnote 18.
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level of earnings (or income) of adult males.'6 The level of earnings
is positively related to the levels of schooling, age, and employ-
ment (weeks worked) during the year.'7
Let us recall that the rate of return from training and dollar in-
vestments in training translate the distribution of years of training
into a distribution of earnings. Thus, the greater the rate of return
and dollar investments, the stronger the effect of the level of
schooling and age on the level of earnings. Independent empirical
evidence shows lower rates of return from training and smaller in-
vestments in postschool training for nonwhites than whites for the
period under study.'8 Therefore, the schooling and age distribu-
tions can be expected to have a weaker effect on the earnings level
of nonwhite males than on that of white males.
In the analyses for all males and all white males, the schooling
and age variables explain approximately 70 per cent of interstate
differences in the level of earnings. The variables have the expected
effects and tend to be statistically significant.'9 The model is less
successfulinexplaining interstate differences in the level of
income.
In the case of nonwhite males, the schooling and employment
(weeks worked) variables affect earnings in the expected direction
and explain nearly 80 per cent of interstate differences in the levels
of earnings and income.20 The distribution of age appears to have
no effect, and the distribution of schooling a weaker effect for
nonwhites than for whites, on interstate differences in the level of
earnings or income. White-nonwhite differences in the level of
earnings across states are found to be due largely (80 to 90 per
cent) to racial differences in the explanatory variables (particularly
the lower levels for nonwhites in schooling and weeks of employ-
ment during the year).
16. Chapter 7 is devoted to the development and testing of this model
for the United States and Canada.
17. For technical reasons developed in Chapter 7, the level of income is
also related to the inequalities of schooling and age.
18. Becker,Human Capital, Chapter IV; Finis Welch,"Black•White Differ-
ences in Returns to Schooling,"American Economic Review, December 1973,
pp. 89 3-907; Mincer, "On-the-Job Training"; Johnson, "Returns from Invest-
ment in Human Capital." An alternative explanation for the flatter nonwhite
experience-earnings profile is a more rapid rise in school quality and job op-
portunities for young nonwhites compared to young whites.
19. The variable for the level of employment is not significant, but this
may be because of its very small variation across the states for all males and
all white males.
20. The employment variable, the mean log of weeks worked, has twice
the variation across states for nonwhite males than it has for all males or
white males.28 Introduction
In Canada, the schooling and age variables explain 95 per cent
of provincial differences in the level of income of nonfarm males.
Although the level of age does not have an independent effect, the
level of schooling (and the inequality of schooling and age) have
strong effects in the expected direction. The results are quite simi-
lar, therefore, to those obtained for the United States.
ANALYSIS OF INEQUALITY OF INCOME
Regional differences in the inequality of earnings or income
can be analyzed by combining the implications of the schooling,
postschool training, and employment models. These suggest that
income inequality is greater the larger the inequalities of schooling,
age, and weeks worked during the year. Each of these variables is
included in the empirical analysis.2' Higher rates of return from
schooling and postschool training and larger dollar investments per
year of training also increase income inequality. Rates of return
from schooling are computed by race in each unit of observation
(state or province). If, as appears to be the case, nonwhites have
flatter experience-earnings profiles in the cross-section than whites,
the effect of the inequality of age will be weaker for nonwhites
than for whites.
The elasticity of earnings with respect to the fraction of weeks
worked (y) can be estimated from the analysis of income in-
equality. Since it appears that nonwhite male workers may invest
in less postschool training and have greater seasonality in their em-
ployment than white males, the parameter y is expected to be
lower for the former than for the latter.
In the empirical analyses (Chapter 8) for all males and all
white males in the United States, the model explains a large pro-
portion of interstate differences in income inequality (85 to 92 per
cent) and earnings inequality (approximately 80 per cent). The in-
equalities of schooling, age, and employment and the rate of return
from schooling have strong positive effects on income inequality.
In the parallel analysis for nonwhite males, the model performs
equally well—approximately 85 per cent of the differences in in.
equality are attributable to the model. The inequalities of school-
21. The income inequality model for the United States and Canada is
developed and tested in Chapter 8. Under the set of simplifying, yet tech-
nical, assumptions developed there, three additional variables enter the
analysis—the covariance of schooling and age, the years of schooling, and the
years of postschool experience.
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ing and weeks of employment and the rate of return from school-
ing have significant positive effects on interstate differences in
nonwhite income inequality. The elasticity of earnings with respect
to the fraction of weeks worked (-y) is less than unity for nonwhite
males, but not for white males.
Within states, the observed inequality of annual income is
smaller for nonwhites than for whites. Since nonwhites experience
a larger inequality in weeks worked during the year than whites, it
follows that their inequality of weekly income is even smaller than
the inequality based on annual income. This small intrastate non-
white inequality of weekly income is not due to differences in the
distribution of schooling or age, but to the rate of return from
schooling and the effect on income of differences in age (ex-
perience). Thus, the smaller within-state inequality in income of
nonwhites may be due, in part, to less investment in postschool
training. A more important role can possibly be assigned to the
greate. rise in the quality of schooling and the quantity of job op-
portunities for young nonwhites than- for young whites in the
decade or two prior to 1960. This would tend to flatten the
experience-earnings profileinthe cross-section for nonwhites
compared to whites.
Regional differences in income inequality are also studied
with the Canadian provinces as the unit of observation. The school-
ing and age variables, including the rate of return from schooling,
explain 75 per cent of provincial differences in the income in-
equality of adult nonfarm males.22 The Canadian pattern is similar
to that for nonwhite males in the United States: on the one hand,
an insignificant effect of the inequality of age, and, on the other,
significant positive effects of the rate of return and schooling
inequality.
Thus, the human capital and employment model of income
distribution outlined in this chapter (developed and tested in
greater detail in Part C of this volume) appears to be a very power-
ful tool for studying regional differences in the level and inequality
of labor market income.
22. Appropriate data are not available for analyzing the effects of
differences in the distribution of weeks worked.4
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